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ABSTRACT
The steady reports of privacy invasions online paints a picture of
the Internet growing into a more dangerous place. This is supported
by reports of the potential scale for online harms facilitated by the
mass deployment of online technology and the data-intensive web.
While Internet users often express concern about privacy, some
report taking actions to protect their privacy online. We investigate
the methods and technologies that individuals employ to protect
their privacy online. We conduct two studies, of N=180 and N=907,
to elicit individuals’ use of privacy methods online, within the US,
the UK and Germany. We find that non-technology methods are
among the most used methods in the three countries. We identify
distinct groupings of privacy methods usage in a cluster map. The
map shows that together with non-technology methods of privacy
protection, simple PETs that are integrated in services, form the
most used cluster, whereas more advanced PETs form a different,
least used cluster. We further investigate user perception and rea-
soning for mostly using one set of PETs in a third study with N=183
participants. We do not find a difference in perceived competency
in protecting privacy online between advanced and simpler PETs
users. We compare use perceptions between advanced and simpler
PETs and report on user reasoning for not using advanced PETs, as
well as support needed for potential use. This paper contributes to
privacy research by eliciting use and perception of use across 43
privacy methods, including 26 PETs across three countries and pro-
vides a map of PETs usage. The cluster map provides a systematic
and reliable point of reference for future user-centric investigations
across PETs. Overall, this research provides a broad understanding
of use and perceptions across a collection of PETs, and can lead to
future research for scaling use of PETs.
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• Security and privacy→Humanand societal aspects of secu-
rity and privacy; Privacy protections; Social aspects of security
and privacy; Usability in security and privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The deployment of technology at massive scale is thought to have
enabled the rapid emergence of a set of ‘online harms’ such as
privacy abuses, data breaches, cyber-attacks, inappropriate uses
of personal data, hate crimes, and self-harm/suicide among oth-
ers [109]. Today’s data-intensive web is characterized with mass
sharing, collection and aggregation of individuals’ data, that en-
ables the provisioning of customised services but unfortunately
also engenders targeted advertising [14], digital discrimination [31],
privacy invasive algorithmic computations [35], and a general fuzzy-
ness about privacy rights online. The recent years have indeed seen
reports of various high profile privacy infringement cases involving
mass unauthorised transfer and use of sensitive data [37, 70, 82].
At the forefront of the narrative that “the Internet is a dangerous
place", is the UK, where the British Government has released an
Online Harms white paper that elaborates on the scale and extent of
harms faced by individuals online. It proposes a mission of mitigat-
ing online harms without inhibiting online innovation [109]. One
of the strands of this mission is to empower citizens via technol-
ogy, in particular via awareness, usage and integration of Privacy-
Enhancing Technologies (PETs) in real life situations. PETs are de-
fined by the EU Agency for CyberSecurity, as technologies shaped
according to privacy principles, where PETs “covers the broader
range of technologies that are designed for supporting privacy and
data protection" [32]. Integrating PETs in daily life and scaling use
of PETs, first requires a broad understanding of current use of PETs.
For a user perspective of online harms, the Oxford Internet Insti-
tute looked into how UK individuals’ experience of problems online
influence their behavior, in an Oxford Internet Survey (OxIS) [13].
They found that non-users of the Internet (who made up 10% of
the respondents), were more concerned than users about privacy
violations, consequently keeping themselves offline. Surprisingly,
Internet users were not more concerned about the possibility of
being a victim online in 2019 compared to 2013. In 2019, general
privacy concern increased only by 4%, and 26-31% of respondents
have taken action to protect their purchases, age, marital status
or medical details and 40% their contact details. According to Pew
Research Center of the US, although a majority of US consumers
think that they have little or no control over how their personal
information is collected and used by companies (81% in 2019 com-
pared to 91% in 2013) [5, 64], between 10% to 19% feel that they
have a lot of control over different forms of personal information,
such as physical location, social media posts, private conversations,
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purchases, or websites visited [5]. The European Commission re-
ports a Eurobarometer survey in 2019 with findings that 51% of
those who provide personal information online felt that they have
partial control over this information, while 14% felt that they have
complete control. 62% of those feeling partial or no control were
concerned about not having complete control. In addition, a major-
ity of the respondents in 2019 have heard of the rights guaranteed
by the GDPR, and some have exercised these rights [34].
Given (1) the above reports of nuances in privacy concerns over
the years and that some individuals take actions towards privacy,
as well as (2) the well known privacy paradox phenomenon [4,
38, 55, 95], this paper seeks to investigate the following questions:
‘what privacy methods or PETs do Internet users employ to protect
their privacy? How do Internet users perceive the use of PETs?’ We
contribute to the rich landscape of user-centric privacy research,
that has expansively addressed privacy behavior, including via the
(extent of) disclosure of personal information [3, 4, 8, 26, 72, 95],
privacy strategies [1, 17, 75, 105] or the use of privacy controls and
individual PETs [1, 12, 26, 39, 46, 71, 87, 100], with a large-scale and
cross-national study of the use of a collection of PETs.
We first investigate the use/non-use of a range of privacy meth-
ods and PETs across three countries, rather than taking an in-depth
look at how users interact with individual PETs [12, 46, 71, 87]
or engage with controls [39, 69]. This provides a broad view of
what privacy methods and PETs individuals use, and enables us to
uncover patterns of use and preferences.
Second, while various factors may influence the use/non-use of
particular privacy controls and PETs, such as perceived risks [36,
39], perceived usefulness [12, 46] or demographics [75, 76], we focus
on what happens following individuals’ concern about their privacy,
in particular, whether they are aware of PETs and how they perceive
use of PETs (c.f. the staircase/steps towards using a particular PET
by Renaud et al. [87]). We postulate that PETs use patterns may be
evidence of differences in use perceptions, in rationale for use or
support needed. Therefore, rather than investigating perception
of use of individual PETs [12, 46], we evaluate perceptions across
clusters of PETs. This enables us to investigate whether (1) use
perceptions and rationale are clearly demarcated across the patterns,
as well as (2) to simultaneously understand why individuals prefer
a particular collection of PETs.
Contributions. We provide both the quantitative grounding of
classification, as well as the rich qualitative investigation of why
individuals prefer one type of PETs over another. We provide a
large-scale, cross-national, mixed-methods (quantitative and qual-
itative) investigation of PETs usage. We classify patterns of use
of privacy methods online (including PETs and non-technology
methods), in Studies 1 & 2 via a clustering approach. This provides
a systematic, evidence-based and reliable point of reference for
PETs usage categorisation and future research, and a classification
based on patterns of use of PETs (rather than design type or protec-
tion provided). We therefore also provide re-usable methodology
to better understand clusters of PETs, that can further drive investi-
gations and understanding of PETs use via comparison of clusters,
transition between clusters or inter-PETs usage.
We find that the cluster map distinguishes usage of PETs into
Advanced and Other PETs, and that non-technology privacy meth-
ods are among the most used methods online. We demonstrate use
of the PETs usage classification within an investigation of why
certain PETs are preferred over others, in Study 3. While we find
support for themes identified in previous privacy controls and PETs
use research, in particular with regards to awareness of privacy
protection [87, 93], perceived usefulness [12, 46], usability [1, 87],
or trust [12, 46], we expand on the themes of information about
PETs, privacy needed and usability as well as report other rationales
for not using advanced PETs, such as perceived monetary cost and
social support. We also find that there is no statistical difference in
individuals’ perceived competency to protect their privacy online,
whether they are Advanced or Other PETs users.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: we first
review background research, and then provide a section describing
Study 1 and 2, via their aim, methodology and results. We proceed
into presenting Study 3, also via aim, methodology and results.
We complete the paper with an overall discussion and conclusion,
and provide an Appendix with additional support, including the
questionnaires used in the studies.
2 BACKGROUND
Given our paper computes patterns of privacy methods usage and
investigates user perceptions across clusters, we provide a review
of literature addressing (1) privacy behavior, of which use of PETs
is one aspect, and (2) technology adoption and classification of user
responses in privacy research.
2.1 Privacy Behavior
We review a few strands of privacy behavior related research, in par-
ticular, (1) different protection practices, (2) factors impacting use
of privacy controls and PETs, and (3) cross-national investigations
of privacy concerns and behavior.
2.1.1 Privacy Protection Practices. The privacy research commu-
nity is well acquainted with the privacy paradox phenomenon—
where on the one hand users express concerns about the handling
of their personal data and desire protection, while on the other hand,
they voluntarily disclose via social networks or rarely make an ef-
fort to protect their data actively [3, 4, 15, 26, 72, 95]. Observations
of the privacy paradox have also been discussed [26, 81] and sys-
tematic reviews of privacy paradox research conducted [9, 38, 55].
One of the resulting observations is that both privacy attitude and
behavior can be conceptualised in different ways [20, 38, 55].
Research has operationalised privacy behavior in different ways,
including via (the extent of) disclosure, via use of privacy controls
and PETs, or via the adoption of protection strategies. First, privacy
behavior as disclosure include observations such as revelations to
an online bot [95], Facebook membership [3] and revelations in a
bank and pharmaceutical scenario [72] or self-reports such as usage
of Facebook or information disclosed [4, 8, 26]. Second, research
has also operationalised privacy behavior as engaging in protective
control actions and using privacy technology including the gen-
eral use of privacy controls [39], use of controls in the context of
social networks [26, 100], and use of secure encrypted communica-
tion [1, 87], anonymous credentials [12], anonymity service [46],
and VPN [71], or reading the privacy policy [99]. Third, protection
strategies have been investigated such as providing incorrect [75] or
false [17] information, delivering sensitive information in-person
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Table 1: Factors Influencing Protective Privacy Behavior
Factor PETs/Context of Use
Years of internet experience social/technical protection [76]
Internet skill Facebook privacy settings [47]
Perceived rewards in disclosure general/technical protection [69]
Privacy risks concerns general/technical protection [69]
Unawareness of risks social networks [39]
Risks of sharing social networks [36]
Perceived usefulness & ease of use anonymizing technology [12, 46]
Emotional considerations VPN use [71]
Knowledge about how to protect oneself E2EE [87]
Awareness of protection tools E2EE & tracking [87, 93]
No perceived need to act E2EE & tracking [87, 93]
Inability to use protection tracking [93]
Becoming side-tracked tracking [93]
Usability E2EE & secure msg [1, 87]
Social Influence secure msg & social networks [1, 39]
Education Facebook sharing [36]
Gender technical protection [75, 76],
social network control [98]
Note: E2EE refers to end-to-end encryption
or using a “code" to deliver sensitive information to others [1],
and deleting friends or rejecting friend requests, self-censoring or
deleting content on social network [105].
2.1.2 Factors Influencing Protective Privacy Behavior. Various re-
search have pointed to factors affecting protective control actions
including a systematic review with comparison of predictor effect
sizes [38], and obstacles to adoption of PETs [39, 87, 93] and secure
communication [1]. We provide a summary of factors in Table 1
(focusing on use of controls and PETs as behavior, rather than dis-
closure or protection strategies described above in Section 2.1.1).
We also name the context of investigation, such as social networks
for inbuilt PETs or name the standalone PET investigated. We note
that some factors were found to be more important than others,
for example the risk of sharing [36], awareness of consequences of
privacy violations [39] and contextual aspects of the messaging tool
such as fragmented user bases [1], were found to be more important
than usability.
2.1.3 Cross-National Influence. While there is no universal pri-
vacy or data protection law that applies across the whole Internet,
a number of international and national privacy frameworks have
largely converged to form a set of core, baseline privacy principles,
that establish fair information practices for consumers, businesses
and organisations. Whereas the General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) provides the legal backbone for data protection and
privacy in Europe [104], the US does not have an all-encompassing
law like the GDPR but has a variety of federal and state laws that
aim to protect a citizenâĂŹs privacy and online data [79] and the
UK established the Data Protection Act 2018 as its implementa-
tion of the GDPR [77]. With regards to Internet users, differences
have been observed in privacy concern, behavior or valuation of
information across countries [10, 16, 22, 65, 86, 97], with some in-
fluence of national culture (where national culture is viewed as
the collective mindset distinguishing members of one nation from
another [48], and is embedded in the way members think, feel and
act [49]), in particular via the collectivist versus individualist dis-
tinctions [16, 65, 86] or relational mobility [97]. Others have looked
into the privacy calculus across countries in contexts such as e-
commerce [28], social network [56], health records [27] or driving
behavior [54]. These studies leveraged population samples world-
wide [10, 86], or compared the US versus Asian countries [65, 97],
the US versus Asia-Pacific countries [16], the US versus European
countries [27, 28, 54, 56], or across European countries [22, 44].
2.2 Technology Adoption & Patterns
2.2.1 Model of Technology Adoption. The Technology Acceptance
Model (TAM) provides the theoretical background for understand-
ing why users accept or reject technology [24]. It has been empiri-
cally demonstrated to successfully predict 40% of system use [60].
TAM suggests that perceived ease of use (PEOU) and perceived use-
fulness (PU) are two most important factors explaining technology
use. Privacy research employing TAM as psychological construct
ranged from (1) understanding adoption of specific PETs, such as
user acceptance of anonymous credentials [12], anonymity tech-
nology [46], and VPNs [71]; to (2) perceived privacy in adoption
of technologies such as social media [84], e-commerce [57, 103],
biometrics [68], Snapchat [61] or trading systems [89].
2.2.2 Cluster Analysis for User-Centric Privacy. Investigations into
patterns of use of technology may enable identification of broad
usage trends across single or a collection of technologies. This can
be conducted via cluster analysis, which supports the identifica-
tion of patterns and provides an objective methodology for quan-
tifying structural characteristics of observations, and relationship
identification [7, 63]. Cluster analysis has also been employed in
user-centric studies in the privacy context to better understand per-
ceptions or behaviors. Example investigations using cluster analysis
include SNS engagement and privacy habits in relation to trans-
port [30], privacy management strategies in Facebook [59], privacy
perceptions based on geographical regions [50], perceptions of
information sensitivity between countries [92], cross-country com-
parison of adolescents’ privacy perceptions [94], privacy versus
sharing perceptions [74], and privacy and risks perceptions to better
understand behavior [21].
3 STUDY 1 & 2
3.1 Aim
We explore usage of privacy methods online in visual maps. We
sample participants from the US, UK and German populations.
3.1.1 Privacy Method Patterns. We posit that individuals likely
engage with privacy via a habitual collection of methods or pattern
of actions, where habits are actions that have become automat-
ically triggered by situational cues [58]. We investigate as RQ1,
“What patterns emerge in individuals’ privacy methods usage and
preference? How similar are usage patterns across privacy meth-
ods?" Because we do not have a-priori expectations of the nature
of relationships between privacy method preferences, we employ a
Cluster Analysis [63] to naturally distinguish different patterns of
use, and further look into usage patterns in relation to country via
a Correspondence Analysis [40, 41].
3.1.2 Cross-National Privacy Method Similarities. The diffusion
and adoption of technology do not necessarily follow a common
pattern in terms of rates or timing across countries. Adoption of
technology is often influenced by cross-national factors [6, 33],
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where in particular, use of technology for privacy may be influenced
by regulation. We investigate as RQ2, “What methods are mostly
used to protect one’s privacy online? what similarities emerge
between countries?"
3.2 Method
We conduct two survey studies online. The first study (Study 1)
is aimed at identifying a preferred list of privacy methods. The
second study (Study 2) employs the compiled list of methods from
Study 1 to query participants about their use of the range of privacy
methods identified.
3.2.1 Participants. With their advanced digital economies, Europe
and the US may be considered as the drivers of protection tech-
nology around the globe. However, Europe versus the US differ in
privacy regulation [83] and potentially also in individuals’ privacy
protection patterns.
For Study 1, we sampled N = 180 participants, comprising N =
58 US participants, N = 62 UK participants and N = 60 German
(DE) participants. We sampled participants from Prolific Academic.
The data quality of Prolific Academic has good reproducibility [78],
and is comparable to Amazon Mechanical Turk’s which is widely
used in security and privacy user studies.
For Study 2, we recruited an N = 907 sample from the US, UK
and DE via Prolific Academic. The samples from the US and the UK
were representative of age and gender of the respective countries,
as provided by Prolific Academic. For the DE sample, we did not
achieve a representative sample in terms of gender and age.
Table 2 provides a summary of the demographic details for the
two studies. The studies lasted between 10 to 20 minutes. Partici-
pants were compensated at a rate of £7.5 per hour, slightly above
the minimum rate of £5 per hour suggested by Prolific Academic.
Table 2: Participant Characteristics
Country N Mean Age Gender
#Female #Male
Study 1
US 58 35.53 29 29
UK 62 30.65 43 19
DE 60 30.68 27 33
Study 2
US 303 43.72 155 148
UK 303 44.21 154 149
DE 301 28.91 115 186
3.2.2 Procedure. Study 1 aims to identify and compile a list of
privacy methods preference. We do so via an open-ended question,
across three countries. Study 1 consisted of a questionnaire on
demographics, and an open-ended query to list three to five tools
most often employed to achieve the purpose of privacy online.
Study 2 followed the same format as Study 1, except that we
changed the open-ended queries of the first study to close-ended
privacy methods questions, for participants to select the methods
they mostly use from the whole list provided. We also shifted to a
larger sample for the three countries. We provide a summary of the
procedure in Figure 1.
3.2.3 Measurement Apparatus. Study 1: We queried participants
on the individual privacy methods they most often use, eliciting
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Figure 1: Studies 1 & 2 design.
their own methods via the instruction “List between 3 to 5 tools
that you have most often employed before to achieve the purpose
of privacy online."
Study 2: We asked participants to rate the list of privacy meth-
ods provided with whether they use them ‘very often’ or ‘very
rarely/not at all’. While we opted for binary data, we found that
querying ‘If you have used them before: Yes/No’ would not fit our
inquiry. ‘Yes’ would include ‘once and never again’ usage type. We
wanted to capture methods that are popular with users (and include
protections that are often but not always used by choice) via ‘very
often’ versus those participants have not thought of or have used
in very rare circumstances (not the go-to protection).
We provide the full question and wording as provided to par-
ticipants in Table 12 in the Appendix A. We pre-tested this list for
comprehension with N = 7 colleagues and acquaintances in the
computing and social science departments, and believe that partic-
ipants in Study 2 understood the wordings, as they were named
by participants in a similar sample in Study 1. We also provide an
open-ended option for ‘other privacy method’.
We encouraged participants to respond truthfully by stating that
the surveys are anonymous in the consent form, and also asking for
truthful answers in the questionnaires. We included attention check
questions throughout the survey and the list of privacy methods
presented to participants in Study 2 was randomised.
3.2.4 Limitations. Representative Sample:While in Study 2 our sam-
ple is representative of the US and UK populations, with respect to
age and gender, we did not achieve a representative sample for DE
(Germany). This explains the difference in mean age for DE com-
pared to the US and UK, in Table 2. From the 2019 demographics
record, the German population has a median age of 47.4, with 37.3%
of the population aged over 54 [51]. The crowd sourcing platform
could not cater for the representative sample for the sample size
we required. Our relatively large sample size however decreases
the probability of assuming as true a false premise. In addition, our
sample characteristic is likely transferable to the larger German
population, where participants in our sample exhibit behaviors of
the general population [80]. However, in future research, it will
be valuable to strive towards representativeness across the sample,
including via attributes such as ethnicity and education level. Al-
ternative crowdsourcing platforms for participant recruitment may
also need to be investigated.
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Table 3: Privacy Methods Categorised by Design Type and Privacy Protection (as elicited in Study 1).
We provide the shorthand shown in the Cluster Map in brackets, where applicable.
Protection
Design Type
Built-in Standalone Non-Technology
Anonymity Encryption Erasery Not Store Info (notstore)
Clear/Delete info/history (clearhistory) Tor Anonymous profile names (anonprofile)
Pseudonyms/Onion (pseudonyms) Proxy NotGivePI / LimitSharing / MinimalInfo (limitshare)
IPHider Several/Bogus / LimitedUse Emails (afewemail)
Virtual machine (virtualma) Fake Info
Limit Use of SNS Accounts (limitsns)
SwitchOffCamera/Devices/PortableHD (switchoffcam)
No Access Acc In Public Place/Networks (nopubac)
Not use FB (noFB)
Not Engaging Online/Careful/Not Signing Up (not-engage)
Browsing History & Private Browsing/incognito (privbrowsing) DuckDuckGo
Tracking Prevention Anti-tracking addon (antitrack) Ghostery
No location tracking (nolocation) NoScript
Clear/Limit cookies (clearcookies)
Communication & Adblock Firewall
Filtering HTTPS VPN
Prevent Leaking & Privacy settings (privset) Password manager (pwd mger) Not save (notsavepwd) or reuse password (notreusepwd)
Stealing of Data Opt out Paypal Read terms of service (readterms)
Private profiles (anonprofile) Anti-spyware (antispy) Request data collected, GDPR (reqdatacol)
Anti-malware (antimal) no newsletter, think twice (nonewslet)
Kapersky Website care/No suspicious sites (suspiciousweb)
Self-Report Bias: Our studies rely mainly on self-reports rather
than system observations. Self-report is a valuable and widely used
method of querying users in security and privacy user studies.
While self-reports can be argued to induce bias, research investigat-
ing response bias in security user studies has found that self-report
insights can translate to real-world environments [85].
The list of privacy methods presented to participants in Study 2
were named from a pool of participants of N = 180 across the three
countries in Study 1. We pre-tested the list for comprehension for
Study 2 with researchers who may be thought to bias the test out-
comes. However, the list was sourced from participants themselves
in Study 1, therefore came from the ‘field’.
3.2.5 Ethics. We obtained approval from the University’s Faculty
Ethics Committee before starting the research, for all the studies
(Studies 1 & 2, as well as Study 3). We sought participants’ consent
for data collection prior to their responding to the questionnaires,
and we did not collect identifying information. Participants were
free to leave the survey at anytime and were compensated slightly
above the advised rate as described in Section 3.2.1.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Compiled Privacy Methods from Study 1. We collect partici-
pants’ responses of 3 to 5 most used privacy tools or methods in
Study 1, with the N = 180. We end up with 43 privacy methods
coded across the three countries and 11 participants stating they
‘don’t know’.
Participants reported privacy methods that may be designed as
(a) a standalone privacy technology, or as (b) privacy controls or
settings integrated (built-in) within other tools such as browsers
or messaging tools. Participants also reported strategies that do
not involve using privacy controls, such as ‘give fake info’, which
we name as ‘non-technology’ methods. We also loosely name four
possible protection categories, namely (1) anonymity (ANO), (2)
browsing history and tracking prevention (BHP), (3) communica-
tion privacy and filtering (COP), and (4) preventing leaking and
stealing of data (PLS). We present the privacy methods elicited ac-
cording to its design type and privacy protection type provided, as
depicted in Table 3. (Note that this loose categorisation only serves
to better present the types of privacy methods named, and do not
affect the rest of the analysis.)
3.3.2 Privacy Method Patterns from Study 2. We investigate RQ1,
“What patterns emerge in individuals’ privacy methods usage and
preference? How similar are usage patterns across privacy meth-
ods?" Our dataset is a contingency table of 43 rows (privacy meth-
ods) and 3 columns (count of participants in the US, UK and DE who
reported to ‘very oftenâĂŹ use the privacy method). We provide
the dataset in Table 13 in Appendix B.
We conduct two multivariate analyses and visualise our dataset:
(1) via a Cluster Analysis [53, 90] that classifies the set of 43 privacy
methods as suggested by natural groupings in the data themselves,
and produce a cluster map as a simplified depiction of the rela-
tionships between privacy methods; and (2) via a Correspondence
Analysis [40, 42] that investigates and visualises the relationship
between the 43 privacy methods across 3 countries, as well as the
similarities between privacy methods given their country profiles.
The main results for this subsection are Figures 4 and 5.
Cluster Analysis. In the next few paragraphs, we report on the
cluster analysis and results via the following steps:
(1) we conduct a dimensionality reduction,
(2) we determine the optimum number of clusters and compute
the cluster analysis,
(3) we assess the internal validity for the cluster analysis, and
(4) we visualise the cluster map and interpret the dimensions.
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We use the R package Factoextra [52] for the cluster computation
and visualisation.
We first compute a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [108] as
dimensionality reduction technique, using the prcomp function in
R. The PCA operates on the 3 country variables to output 3 factors
or principal components (PC), namely PC1, PC2 and PC3. PC1
accounts for 95.4% of the variation in the data, while PC2 accounts
for 4% of variation and PC3 accounts for 0.5%. We describe the
importance of the principal components in Table 4. Together, PC1
and PC2 account for 99.5% of the variation in the data, which is a
large amount of variance. We therefore focus on PC1 and PC2.
Table 4: Importance of Principal Components.
PC1 PC2 PC3
Standard deviation 1.692 0.348 0.128
Proportion of Variance 0.954 0.040 0.005
Cumulative Proportion 0.954 0.995 1.000
We report the factor loadings for PC1 and PC2 in Table 5, where
the country variables load similarly to PC1, while the US and the
UK load in opposite direction to DE for PC2.
Table 5: Factor Loadings.
Variables PC1 PC2
US 0.585 -0.303
UK 0.580 -0.492
DE 0.567 0.816
Second, we employ k-means as cluster analysis method on the
principal components. k-means clustering is the most commonly
used unsupervised machine learning algorithm for partitioning a
given data set into a set of k groups or clusters [63], and groups
observations by minimizing Euclidean distances between them.
Our cluster analysis focuses on the first two principal components
that explain 99.5% variance, and visualise them as Dimension 1
(Dim1) and Dimension 2 (Dim2), where in general, dimensions are
variables or features of data objects [42]. Dim1 refers to PC1, while
Dim2 refers to PC2.
To determine the optimal number of clusters, we use the elbow
method, which consists of optimising the within-cluster sum of
squares (WSS) [42]. We choose a number of clusters so that adding
another cluster does not improve the total WSS much better. From
the plot in Figure 2, the total WSS does not show a sharp improve-
ment after 3 clusters. We subsequently conduct a k-means cluster
analysis with 3 clusters, and summarise distances between pairs of
clusters in Table 6. The 3 clusters correspond to 3 distinct groups of
privacy methods preference, of sizes 19, 13, and 11. Privacy meth-
ods in the same cluster are as similar as possible in terms of user
preference, with low intra-class variation of 11.7%, whereas privacy
methods in different clusters are as dissimilar as possible, with high
inter-class variation of 88.3%. We provide further cluster statistics
in Table 7.
Third, for internal validation of the cluster partitions [62], we
conduct a Silhouette Analysis which measures how well an obser-
vation is clustered and estimates the average distance between
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Figure 2: Determine number of clusters via Elbow Method
Table 6: SeparationMatrix, that is amatrix of separation val-
ues between all pairs of clusters.
Cluster 1 2 3
1 0.0000
2 160.7016 0.00000
3 48.9183 38.48376 0.00000
Table 7: Cluster Statistics
Value Description Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Cluster size 19 13 11
Diameter 122.69 115.90 134.38
Cluster separation 48.92 38.48 38.48
Cluster avg. silhouette width 0.58 0.64 0.43
Avg. distance b/w clusters 204.53
Avg. distance within clusters 57.74
Within cluster sum of squares 82868.96
Between cluster sum of squares 623240.80
Diameter = maximum within cluster distance
Cluster separation = vector of clusterwise minimum distances of a point in the cluster
to a point of another cluster.
clusters [91]. The silhouette plot in Figure 3 displays a measure of
how close each point in one cluster is to points in the neighbouring
cluster, with an average silhouette width Si of 0.56 across the 3
clusters. Si values can range from −1 to 1, where negative values
signify that observations are placed in the wrong cluster and values
close to 1 signify that observations are well clustered. Our Si value
of +0.56 shows that our clustering is okay.
Fourth, we visualise the cluster analysis on a two-dimensional
Cluster Map, as provided in Figure 4 (using the fviz_cluster function
in R). Dim1/PC1 explains 95.4% of variation in the data and have
similar contribution from the three countries as shown by PC1 in
Table 5 and the x-axis of Figure 4. The high variance explained by
this factor likely represent the main characteristic of our dataset,
that is the usage counts. In particular, Figure 4 shows that ‘erasery’
and ‘suspiciousweb’ are at the extreme ends of the x-axis and from
Table 13, they are the least and most used method, respectively. We
therefore interpret Dim1 to characterise ‘The Popularity of Privacy
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Figure 3: Silhouette Plot for Cluster Validity
Method’ (both visually and confirming with the dataset). The red,
right-most cluster pertains to most used privacy methods while
the green and left-most cluster pertains to the least used privacy
methods.
Dim2 (the y-axis of Figure 4, from PC2 in Table 5) depicts the
country of use, where the positive end of the y-axis refers privacy
methods usage more associated to DE, while negative end refers to
usage more associated to the US and UK. For example, ‘pseudonyms’
and ‘readterms’ are both in the same cluster but are at the opposite
ends of the y-axis. From Table 13, we find that ‘pseudonyms’ is
most used in DE compared to US/UK while ‘readterms’ is least used
in DE compared to US/UK.
Correspondence Analysis. The Correspondence Analysis (CA)
is an exploratory technique that graphically represents the relations
among rows and columns of a contingency table, in a spatial map,
and is increasingly popular for dimensional reduction and percep-
tual mapping [42]. We use the dataset of privacy methods count
across each country as in Table 13. In the next few paragraphs, we
report on the CA and results via the following steps: (1) we compute
the CA, (2) we visualise the spatial plot, and (3) we interpret the
dimensions.
First, we identify ‘DuckDuckGo’ as an outlier, and treat it as
a supplementary row, a practice used to treat outliers in corre-
spondence analysis [11]. We compute the CA via the CA function
from the Factoextra package [52] in R. We find significant inde-
pendence of variables with X 2 = 317.016, p < .001, and that the
first dimension accounts for 92.16% of the variance in the data
while the second dimension accounts for 7.84%. Together these two
dimensions account for 100% of variability.
Second, we visualise a spatial plot, using the fviz_ca_biplot func-
tion in R, as provided in Figure 5. The plot shows the row and
column profiles simultaneously in common space. The distance
between data points of the same type (row to row, that is privacy
method to privacy method) is related to the degree to which the
rows have similar profiles in the columns, that is relative frequen-
cies in country variable. The more points belonging to the same set
(pattern) are close to each other and the more similar their profiles
are. As example, individuals who use IPHider and those who give
fake information as privacy methods have similar country profiles,
whereas those who use Tor and ‘read terms and conditions’ as
privacy methods have very dissimilar country profiles.
Third, to interpret the dimensions, we look into the privacy
methods and country that contributes most to defining and charac-
terising each dimension. We provide a plot of the contribution of
the privacy methods to the first dimension in the Appendix C as
Figure 7. The top 10 privacy methods contributing to the definition
of Dimension 1 (the x-axis of Figure 5) in decreasing rank, with
positive (+ve) or negative (-ve) contributions are: (1) NoScript (−ve),
(2) pseudonyms (-ve), (3) read terms and conditions (+ve), (4) Tor
(-ve), (5) no public access (+ve), (6) virtual machine (-ve), (7) VPN
(-ve), (8) not engage (+ve), (9) Ghostery (-ve), (10) give fake info (-ve).
In addition, with regards to country contribution, DE contributes
61% to the definition of Dimension 1. We interpret Dimension 1
to characterise ‘Radicalness of Protective Method’ ranging from
the extreme positive end of the x-axis with ‘Not Engage’, ‘No Pub-
lic Access’ and ‘Read terms and conditions’ as non-technological
solutions to the extreme negative end of the x-axis with NoScript,
pseudonyms, Tor, virtual machine, VPN, Ghostery as PETs and not
engaging with ‘Give Fake Information’. By our interpretation, the
‘Most Radical Protective Methods’ are at the extreme ends of the
x-axis thereby contributing most positively and negatively, and the
‘Least Radical Protective Methods’ are nearer to origin (x = zero).
We note the difference between the cluster and spatial maps.
While the cluster map shows the natural grouping of privacy meth-
ods usage, the spatial map shows similarities in privacy methods
usage based on their relationship to the different countries. In ad-
dition, the cluster analysis uses euclidean distance, whereas the
correspondent analysis uses chi-square statistic. Therefore, Dimen-
sion 1 of both maps do not refer to the same characteristic of privacy
method usage.
3.3.3 Cross-National Method Use Similarities. From Study 2, we
investigate RQ2 “What methods are mostly used to protect one’s
privacy online? What similarities emerge between countries?" Ta-
ble 8 shows a depiction of the top 10 privacy methods preferences
across the three countries, where we observe that 4 of the privacy
methods appear in the top 10 most reported methods in all three
countries. These methods are (1) privacy settings, (2) limit sharing,
(3) website care, and (4) no newsletter. In addition, we find 8 privacy
methods similarities in the top 10 most reported methods for both
the UK and US, 6 methods similarities between the UK and DE, and
5 methods similarities between the US and DE.
4 STUDY 3
4.1 Aim
While individuals are generally reported to be concerned about
their privacy [5, 13, 34, 64], they are not necessarily observed to
actively use PETs, as a consequence of their concern. In particular,
a number of intervening steps may influence the ‘privacy concern
— use of PETs’ link, such as whether individuals perceive a need to
act, are aware of the usefulness PETs or are able to use PETs [87],
amongst the various other factors impacting behavior listed in
Table 1.
We aim to understand use perceptions and reasons for choosing
a collection of PETs. Using the clusters visualised in the cluster
map of Figure 4 (Study 2) as classification of privacy methods usage
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Figure 4: Privacy Methods Clusters along the Popularity of Privacy Method Dimension; left to right = least to most used.
Table 8: Top 10 Privacy Methods by Country starting with most frequently mentioned
United States United Kingdom Germany
Method Design CAT Method Design CAT Method Design CAT
1 Website care NT PLS 1 Website care NT PLS 1 AdBlock BI COP
2 Privacy settings BI PLS 2 Limit Sharing NT ANO 2 Bogus Emails NT ANO
3 Limit Sharing NT ANO 3 Privacy settings BI PLS 3 Privacy settings BI PLS
4 Research before engaging NT ANO 4 Clear Info/History BI ANO 4 Limit Sharing NT ANO
5 Anti-Malware ST PLS 5 Paypal ST PLS 5 No Newsletter NT PLS
6 No Newsletter NT PLS 6 Research before engaging NT ANO 5 Paypal ST PLS
7 AdBlock BI COP 7 No Newsletter NT PLS 5 Website care NT PLS
8 Clear Info/History BI ANO 8 Firewall ST COP 5 Firewall ST COP
9 Clear/Limit Cookies BI BHP 9 Anti-Malware ST PLS 9 HTTPS BI COP
10Not Access Accts in Public Place NT ANO 10Not Access Accts in Public Place NT ANO 10Pseudonyms BI ANO
BI, ST & NT refer to design type of built-in, standalone and non-technology respectively.
ANO, BHP, COP & PLS refer to privacy protection categories of anonymity, browsing history and tracking prevention, communication privacy & filtering, and preventing leaking &
stealing of data respectively.
patterns, we examine individuals’ perceptions of the PETs in the
different clusters, and their rationale for a particular choice. We cre-
ate two lists of PETs from the cluster map, that we name Advanced
PETs (Adv.PETs) and Other PETs (Oth.PETs):
Advanced PETs List: Adv.PETs is populated with the PETs in the
leftmost cluster, which contains the least used and more advanced
solution to privacy protection. We also add VPN and encryption,
which fall on the left of the centroid of the middle cluster, to the list.
In particular, Adv.PETs refers to a list of the following PETs: Erasery,
Ghostery, virtual machine, Tor, NoScript, IPHider, Kaspersky, Duck-
DuckGo, proxy, anti-tracking extension, VPN, and encryption.
Other PETs List: Oth.PETs is populated with the PETs in the
rightmost cluster, which contains the most used privacy methods.
We also add pseudonyms and ‘anonymous profile’, which fall on
the right of the centroid of the middle cluster, to the list. Oth.PETs
refers to the following list of PETs: switch off location tracking,
private browsing, HTTPS, anti-spyware, opt-out (of data collection),
clear cookies, anti-malware, clear history, Paypal, firewall, Adblock,
privacy settings, pseudonyms and anonymous profile.
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Figure 5: Spatial Plot of Privacy Methods & Country.
Research Questions. The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM),
as discussed in Section 2.2.1 depicts how perceptions explain use
of technology [24]. We focus on the main components of the TAM,
namely perceived usefulness (PU), perceived ease of use (PEOU) as
well as behavior intention (BI), to investigate perceptions of use of
Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs.
We first ask “Do individuals prefer to use Adv.PETs (Adv.Users)
or Oth.PETs (Oth.Users)?" We then investigate as RQ3, “How do
Adv.Users’ perceptions of use differ betweenAdv.PETs andOth.PETs?"
and “How do Oth.Users’ perceptions of use differ between Adv.PETs
and Oth.PETs?" via the hypotheses:
H3a,0: Adv.Users show no difference in perceptions of use between
Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs.
H3o,0: Oth.Users show no difference in perceptions of use between
Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs.
H3a,1: Adv.Users show a significant difference in perceptions of use
between Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs.
H3o,1: Oth.Users show a significant difference in perceptions of use
between Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs.
We also investigate other factors such as competency, as an an-
tecedent to technology acceptance, as well as factors contributing
to the use of privacy technology, such as awareness and social in-
fluence. Social influence is a factor well investigated in relation to
technology adoption and usage [96, 101].
We investigate as RQ4, “Does perceived competency at manag-
ing one’s privacy online differ between Adv.Users and Oth.Users?"
H4,0: There is no difference in perceived privacy competency be-
tween Adv.Users and Oth.Users.
H4,1: There is a significant difference in perceived privacy compe-
tency between Adv.Users and Oth.Users.
We investigate asRQ5, “Do Adv.Users’ and Oth.Users’ [awarene-
ness of/perceived social influence to use] differ between Adv.PETs
and Oth.PETs?" via the hypotheses
H5a,0: Adv.Users show no difference in [awareneness of/perceived
social influence to use] between Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs.
H5o,0: Oth.Users show no difference in [awareneness of/perceived
social influence to use] between Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs.
H5a,1: Adv.Users show a significant difference in awareneness
of/perceived social influence to use] betweenAdv.PETs andOth.PETs.
H5o,1: Oth.Users show a significant difference in awareneness of/
perceived social influence to use] between Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs.
We further query participants on why they chose Adv.PETs or
Oth.PETs, as well as the support they would need to use the other
type of PETs, as RQ6.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants. For the third study, we recruited an N = 183
from the US, UK and DE via Prolific Academic. The demographics
across the 3 countries is provided in Table 9.
Table 9: Participant Characteristics
Country N Mean Age Gender
#Female #Male
Study 3
US 40 31.50 25 15
UK 101 37.23 58 43
DE 42 28.98 16 26
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Figure 6: Study 3 design.
4.2.2 Procedure. Study 3 consisted of the following questionnaires:
(a) demographics, (b) perceived competency in protecting privacy
online, (c) description of two lists of PETs (List A, the Adv.PETs
and List B, the Oth.PETs) and questions on which set participants
mostly use, as well as support they believe they would need to use
the other set, and (d) awareness, perceived usefulness, ease of use,
social influence, behavior intention to compare between the two
sets of PETs. We depict the procedure in Figure 6.
4.2.3 Measurement Apparatus. This section describes the ques-
tions and scales employed in Study 3, where we employed good
practice guidelines of security and privacy user studies [18, 19], in
adapting existing scales, as much as possible.
Choice of PETs, Reasoning & Support: We provided participants
with two lists of PETs and asked “Which of the two lists contains
the privacy methods that you most often use to protect your privacy
online?” We then asked them to explain why they ‘most often’ use
PETs from one list and why they ‘very rarely or not at all’ use
methods from the other list. We further queried about what would
support them to use methods from the list they did not select, in
particular, what would help or encourage them. We provide the full
questions and wording in the Appendix D.
Perceived Competency: We adapt Williams & Deci’s [106, 107]
perceived competence questionnaire to privacy protection online.
We provide the 4 items of the questionnaire in Table 14 of the
Appendix E. The questionnaire is provided with a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 - “Not true at all" to 7 - “Very True" and a
midpoint at 4 with “Somewhat True".
Technology acceptance model components:We adapt Davis [24, 25]
scale for measuring the components of TAM, namely for perceived
usefulness, perceived ease of use and intention to use privacy tech-
nology, as provided in Table 14 of the Appendix E. The scales were
provided with 5-point Likert ranging from 1 - “Strongly Disagree"
to 5 - “Strongly Agree".
Awareness & Social Influence: We created a 4-item questionnaire
to gauge awareness of PETs, as shown in Table 14 of the Appen-
dix E. We further adapt the social influence scale from Venkatesh
et al. [102], where social influence is defined as the degree to which
an individual perceives that important others believe he should
use the new system. These scales are provided on a 5-point Likert
ranging from 1 - “Strongly Disagree" to 5 - “Strongly Agree".
4.2.4 Limitations. Self-Report Questionnaires: Similar to Studies 1
and 2, Study 3’s data collection is based on self-reports. However, in
Study 3, we employ standard questionnaires with scales composed
of multiple items. These scales have been widely used and validated
in past research, as referenced in Section 4.2.3. We provide the
assessment of internal consistency obtained in Study 3 for each
scale in Table 14 of the Appendix.
Additional measures and ordering: While we carefully selected
questionnaires for the purpose of Study 3, additional ones such as to
elicit participants’ tech-savviness could provide means of verifying
the self-reported Perceived Privacy Competency questionnaire, for
example. In addition, placing the demographics questionnaire at
the fore may consume participants’ attention span. We included
attention checks throughout the study. However, in the future, we
would comsider to position the demographics questionnaire at the
end of the study.
4.3 Quantitative Results
In Study 3, we asked participants to select the list containing the
PETs they most often use. We detailed the contents of the lists in
Section 4.1. Only 17 of 183 participants mostly use Adv.PETs, that
is the list pertaining to the least used cluster. All the remaining
participants chose the Oth.PETs list. We distinguish these 2 groups
of users as Adv.Users and Oth.Users.
We compute the internal consistency of the items for each of the
perception scales. We provide the Cronbach α values in Table 14 of
the Appendix E.
We investigate RQ3, How does Adv.Users’ and Oth.Users’ percep-
tions of use differ between Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs?, and RQ5, do
Adv.Users’ and Oth.Users’ [awareneness of/perceived social influence
to use] differ between Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs?
We compute pairwise t-tests for Adv.PET and Oth.PETs across
participant responses for awareness of PETs, perceived usefulness,
perceived ease of use, behavior intention and social influence. We
summarise the results in Table 10, where Oth.Users showed signif-
icantly higher perceptions of Oth.PETs than of Adv.PETs, across
all scales with p < .001. We reject the null hypotheses, H3o,0 and
H5o,0 that Oth.Users show no difference in perceptions of use be-
tween Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs, for the five use perceptions shown in
Table 10. Adv.Users only reported higher perceived usefulness of
Adv.PETs than of Oth.PETs. We accept the null hypotheses H3a,0
andH5a,0 for Adv.User for all user perceptions, except for perceived
usefulness.
We investigate RQ4, Does perceived competency at managing
one’s privacy online differ between Adv.Users and Oth.Users? We
compute differences in perceived competence between Adv.Users
and Oth.Users, with an independent samples Mann-Whitney U
test. We do not observe a statistical significant difference in per-
ceived competency in ensuring privacy protection online between
Adv.Users and Oth.Users. We therefore accept the null hypothe-
sis H4,0 that there is no difference in perceived privacy competency
between Adv.Users and Oth.Users.
4.4 Qualitative Results
We investigate RQ6, that is “why do individuals choose Adv.PETs
or Oth.PETs? what support would they need to use the other type
of PETs?" This section describes the coding process and reports
responses for (1) users of both types of PETs, (2) users of Adv.PETs
and (3) users of Oth.PETs. Note that List A in the survey refers to
Adv.PETs and List B refers to Oth.PETs.
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Table 10: Within-group pairwise comparison of technology
use perception of Adv.PETs vs. Oth.PETs, where Oth.Users
have higher perceptions of Oth.PETs than Adv.PETs
Use Perception Adv.Users Oth.Users
t (16) p t (165) p
Awareness Oth.PETs -16.290 .000
Perceived Usefulness Adv.PETs 2.787 .013 Oth.PETs -6.999 .000
Perceived Ease of Use Oth.PETs -18.494 .000
Behavior Intention Oth.PETs -15.189 .000
Social Influence Oth.PETs -9.231 .000
4.4.1 Codebook Creation. The sample of N = 183 participants in
Study 3 were asked two open free-form questions: Q1, why they
mostly use methods from one list, and Q2, what would support
them to use methods from the other list. Responses were required
to be at least 30 words long, with no maximum.
We facilitated a conventional line by line coding, where n = 50
responses were coded by one coder to extract concepts from the
free-form text. This process has been used in usable privacy re-
search before and is well accepted [20]. The concepts were grouped
into 5 categories for each question, and the coding was validated
and refined with discussions with another coder. We used the set
of categories and concepts to create a codebook. We trained 2 re-
searchers as coders and further refined the codebook with a final
set of 47 codes within 5 categories as provided in Table 15 of the
Appendix F. The ‘-other’ codes, such as EFF03-other were added to
include concepts not initially catered for in the codebook.
We evaluate inter-rater reliability via %-agreement and Cohen
k [43, 67] on 100 responses across the 47 codes. We find that the
coders were on agreement 96% of the time and there was a substan-
tial agreement with Cohen k of .837, p < .001.
4.4.2 Use of both types of PETs. We note that 35 of the 183 par-
ticipants reported using PETs from both lists, where most of them
reported using Oth.PETs primarily and a few Adv.PETs. The few
Adv.PETs that participants reported using are VPN (mentioned by
n = 14), NoScript, DuckDuckGo, Proxy, anti-tracking, Kaspersky
and Ghostery. Note that as described in Section 4.2.2, List A refers
to Adv.PET whereas List B refers to Oth.PETs.
Participants explained that they use Oth.PETs as baseline and
Adv.PETs for critical conditions or as a form of layered protection,
such as expressed by P121 in ‘I think methods on List B are things
that should use [sic] everybody, the bare minimum you should
use while surfing on the world wide web. I also use DuckDuckGo,
VPN, NoScript and Ghostery, but the things on the other List are more
often’, P9 in ‘i [sic] do use some from List A, however list B come
pretty standard with my tech as well as is free and easy to use.’ and
P127 in ‘I mostly use adblock on very restrictive settings, noscript,
no location tracking and private browsing, because these methods
are the most convenient ones. I sometimes use VPN and proxies as
well, but since this requires more action, I only use this in critical
cases.’
In addition, 2 participants reported using VPN for other reasons
than for privacy protection, with for example P112 stating ‘clear
cookies and clear the history is a thing i [sic] do every day [. . . ]
ok sometimes i [sic] use VPN, but not to protect myself only to
watch movies from the US, which are geo blocked’ and P25 ‘I
will occasionally use a VPN if I need to access websites that are not
available without.’
4.4.3 Users of Advanced PETs. Users of Adv.PETs reasoned that
Adv.PETs are more effective in ensuring their privacy online, such
as reported by P117 in ‘List A contains tried and tested methods of
protecting privacy, list B is superficial’ or P105 in ‘list B not effective’.
They also pointed to the trustworthiness of Adv.PETs, as expressed
by P110 ‘Tor is more trustworthy’ or P40 ‘List A is [sic] better to rely
on’.
4.4.4 Users of Other PETs. Overall we find that participants’ rea-
sons for mostly using Oth.PETs corroborated with the support and
encouragement they believe they would need to use Adv.PETs, as
similar themes emerged from the two open-ended questions. We
consequently provide the responses for the two open-ended ques-
tions based on the themes. From the 5 categories of Table 15, we
observe recurrent themes in the responses, namely (1) ‘information
about’ the PETs, (2) ‘usability’ type responses, (3) level of ‘privacy
or protection needed’, (4) ‘cost’ of PET, (5) ‘trust and reliability’ of
PET and (6) ‘social support’ to use PET. We report participants’ rea-
soning for choosing Oth.PETs and support needed to use Adv.PETs
across these themes in Table 11.
5 DISCUSSION
We organise this section into four main sections, with each pro-
viding a brief summary of findings, followed with a discussion of
the implications of our findings as well as their relation to previ-
ous research. We also highlight lines of investigation for future
research.
5.1 Usage Pattern of Privacy Methods
Summary of findings: We visualised privacy methods use via a
cluster map, and relations between methods and country of use
via a spatial map. We identified three clusters pertaining to three
distinct privacy method use patterns, with the left and right clusters
respectively showing the least and most used methods.
Interpretation of Clusters. A visual inspection of the clusters re-
veals insights into participants’ privacy methods preference, such
as, that the right cluster contains simple, easy to use, and conve-
nient methods of protection, that can be said to be more inclusive
of skill levels and are more mainstream, while the leftmost cluster
contains more advanced PETs.
Use of the classification. The results of the clustering may be
used to support users with recommendations, such as suggesting
other privacy methods in the same cluster, with the knowledge that
users with similar methods preference used these other methods,
and the underlying assumption that methods in the same cluster
share similarity in ease of use and perceived required skill. The
classification is also in itself a methodological tool, that can facilitate
further user-centric investigation of PETs.
Cluster Transitions. We consider questions for future research
into facilitating a transition from using a right-cluster method to a
left-cluster method, such as ‘under what conditions do users transi-
tion right to left? what is the influence of more privacy concern,
more skill, a realisation that simple PETs are not enough or the in-
fluence by social contacts?’ ‘how to support users to shift from right
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Table 11: Qualitative Responses from n=166 participants who chose Oth.PETs:
reason for choice & support/encouragement needed to use Adv.PETs
Theme 1: Information About Theme 2: Usability
% %
Reasons Not know Adv.PETs 28.92 Reasons Easy to use/install Oth.PETs 24.10
Familiar with Oth.PETs 27.11 Adv.PETs complicated to use/install 7.83
Technical skills required 6.02 Oth.PETs are readily available 6.63
Belief Oth.PETs are for casual/non-tech savvy users <4 Oth.PETs easy to access 5.42
Need to be advised/recommended <4 Oth.PETs convenient to use 4.82
Amount of work vs benefit gained from Adv.PETs 4.82
Oth.PETs integrated in service <4
Annoyance or discomfort when using Adv,PETs <4
Support What they are/do 36.14 Support Ease of use 14.46
How to use, training 16.27 Ease of installation and configuration 12.05
Via info channels e.g. SNS, tutorials, trusting list 9.04
Theme 3: Privacy & Protection Needed Theme 4: Cost
% %
Reasons For protection provided (‘keeps me private’) 15.06 Reasons Having to pay for/cost of Adv.PETS 14.46
Oth.PETs good enough for privacy needed 10.84 Oth.PETs are free 4.22
Successful experience in using Oth.PETs 6.63
No need for privacy, nothing to hide 5.42
Adv.PETs would be extreme/Oth.PETs for everyday use 4.22
Privacy vs online experience <4
Support If need specific PET protection functionality (e.g. anonymity) 9.04 Support If Adv.PETs were free/affordable 16.87
If Adv.PETs provided more privacy than what they use 8.43
If they had a bigger privacy need 6.02
Theme 5: Trust & Reliability Theme 6: Social Support
% %
Reason Trust in PETs 9.04 Reason n/a
Support If Adv.PETs did not look fake/phoney 5.42 Support Recommended by reputable company 5.42
If someone they know/trust used it <4
If someone taught them how to use or install <4
to left or consolidate his position in the current cluster?’ ‘how can
the methods in the different clusters be used in a layered approach
for more complete protection?’
Cross-National Visualisation. The spatial plot of privacy methods
in relation to country (of Figure 5) clearly shows a gravitation of
German participants towards more advanced and active privacy
methods, compared to US and UK participants. This may be a re-
flection of Germans’ privacy perceptions, where previous research
reported that Germans, compared to participants of other countries,
found controlling access to personal data, private realms and data
protection more important [94], were among those most sensitive
to the duration and quantity of data collection (location data) [22],
or attributed a higher probability to privacy violations on SNS [56].
Figure 5 may also support discussions and further investigations of
the effectiveness of privacy campaigns, of the role of the media or
social connections in a particular country.
5.2 Non-Technology Methods in Top 10
Summary of findings: Among the similarities in privacy methods
usage across the three countries (from Study 2, Table 8), we find
that non-technology methods (1) of being careful of websites, (2) to
limit sharing, (3) research before engaging (2 out of 3 countries), (4)
not subscribe to newsletters, and (5) not access accounts in public
places, appear in the most used methods across countries.
For the three countries, these non-technology methods made
up 4 or 5 of the top 10 most preferred privacy methods thereby
demonstrating that users rely more on their own means to protect
themselves than privacy technologies. This raises questions about
the reasons for reliance on non-technology methods rather than
PETs, such as ‘are users concerned enough and aware of PETs to
use them? how were their previous experience with PETs?’
5.3 Perception of Use
Summary of findings: 9% of participants in Study 3 reported to use
Adv.PETs, 91% to use Oth.PETs and 19% to use PETs from both lists.
The low preference for Adv.PETs corresponds to previous research
findings of no mention or of low use of Adv.PETs [39, 75].
Study 3 enabled us to evaluate perception of use of PETs within
different clusters. From Table 10, it is clear that Oth.Users have
higher use perceptions of Oth.PETs than Adv.PETs, which may
highlight a perceptive barrier to individuals’ use of Adv.PETs. Simi-
lar to previous research of the importance of perceived usefulness
for the adoption of anonymous credentials [12, 46], our respondents
who reported to use Adv.PETs showed higher perceived usefulness
of Adv.PETs than Oth.PETs.
In addition. users of Adv.PETs and Oth.PETs did not report a
difference in their perceived competency in protecting their privacy
online. While perceived competence may predict continuance or
persistence in behavior [73, 88], given that individuals may feel
more motivated to perform a task when they feel competent in,
it may be complex to change individuals’ behavior patterns from
habitual use of Oth.PETs.
5.4 PETs Choice and Support Needed
Summary of findings. The reported responses of Oth.Users in Study
3 support and extend the findings of previous research on factors
influencing the active use of PETs (summarised earlier in Table 1
of Section 2.1.2). We report Oth.Users’ responses in Table 11 and
discuss them below.
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Our findings contribute to previous research with a collective
perspective that is neither specific to particular PETs nor contex-
tual to use scenario, such as social network or e-commerce. Our
methodology may therefore help to identify general beliefs and
biases of users that act as obstacles to the use of Adv.PETs. In par-
ticular, Table 11 depicts a picture of ‘don’t know, therefore don’t
use Adv.PETs’, and yet have perceptions that Adv.PETs are not easy
to use/install, are costly, or are not trustworthy. Therefore, further
to being aware of Adv.PETs, individuals may also have to overcome
the biased perceptions they hold about these PETs.
Awareness of PETs (from Theme 1: Information about). Our partic-
ipants reported to not knowing about Adv.PETs and would benefit
with an understanding of what they are and what they do. This
is similar to previous reports on awareness of protection tools
or inability to use protection for tracking or end-to-end encryp-
tion [87, 93]. In addition, we also found beliefs of technical skills
requirement, and requiring training or information via social media
and other channels.
Usability (Theme 2). Our participants also expressed a belief that
Adv.PETs are not easy to use or to install, with other usability-
related beliefs listed in Table 11. Ease of use for anonymity technol-
ogy [12, 46] and usability for secure communication [1, 87] were
also reported in previous research. However, although usability
was previously found to not be more important than other factors
(such as risk of sharing in social network [36], contextual aspects
of messaging tool [1] or perceived usefulness [12]), for our partici-
pants, one of the most important reason for using Oth.PETs, rather
than Adv.PETs, was ease of use and configuration, which may be a
biased perception about Adv.PETs’ usability.
Usefulness (Theme 3: Privacy & Protection Needed). Our partici-
pants reported to use Oth.PETs for the protection provided, that
Oth.PETs are good enough, that they had a successful use expe-
rience with Oth.PETs, and that if they were to use Adv.PETs, it
would be for other specific protection functionalities that are not
provided by Oth.PETs. While this points to their satisfaction in
using Oth.PETs, being able to compare the privacy protection pro-
vided between Oth.PETs and Adv.PETs, may provide users with a
wider choice.
Need for Privacy (Theme 3: Privacy & Protection Needed). Some of
our participants reported to not needing privacy/have nothing to
hide, or that using Adv.PETs would be extreme. These loosely match
previous reports of no perceived need to act for tracking protection
and end-to-end encryption technologies [87, 93]. This depicts how
ill-informed users may be with regards to their privacy online, in
particular not knowing how much more protection Adv.PETs can
offer them, as well as not realising the potential extent of privacy
loss and online harms in the data-centric web.
Cost (Theme 4). Our participants referenced the perceived mon-
etary cost Adv.PETs to be a deterrent to their use. In comparison,
previous research investigations in relation to cost included the
perceived value of information [22], monetary reward for disclo-
sure [45], cost and benefits tradeoffs of disclosure [29], cost of
privacy breaches [2] or the time spent reading privacy policies [66].
Trust & Social Support (Themes 5 & 6). PETs’ trustworthiness
and recommendation (either socially or accredited via a reputable
company), were also deemed important, as well as social support
to recommend or teach how to use Adv.PETs. Trust has also been
considered before in investigations involving the active use of pri-
vacy controls [36] and adoption of PETs [12, 46], and in relation to
accessible and salient privacy information in websites [99], while
social influence had links with the use of privacy [1, 39] and secu-
rity [23] controls. While neutral accredited lists already exist via
privacy-promoting organisations such as the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, the influence of social connections and support from
those individuals know and/or trust may have a ‘multiplier’ effect
in increasing use of Adv.PETs. Social influence and support can
facilitate integration of PETs into daily life, expand use to more
casual users, as well as help sustain use.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper provides a large scale, cross-national investigation of the
use of a collection of privacy methods online, derives patterns of use
and follows-up with an investigation of perception of use of PETs
between the patterns. The usage classification, while contributing
to our knowledge of PETs use, also provides a methodological
contribution to the field. It can further be used in future user-centric
investigations of PETs.
The clusters raise a number of questions about both their com-
ponents and the conditions for transitioning to the least popular
cluster. In addition, by investigating individuals’ own perception of
use of PETs as well as the support they believe they would need to
use more advanced PETs, we highlighted a few themes that may
help to expand the use of advanced PETs. We recommend investi-
gations of the questions raised in the discussion section, as future
work, as well as for designers to consider the reasoning and support
needed by individuals to use PETs (in particular, more advanced
PETs), as provided in this paper.
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A STUDY 2 QUESTIONNAIRE
The 43 privacy methods used in the questionnaire in Study 2 were named by participants themselves in Study 1 and compiled into 43 distinct
methods.
The instruction was “From the list below, please rate the tools/methods in terms of whether you have used them very often before versus
not used at all or very rarely, to achieve the purpose of privacy online."
Table 12: The list of methods as provided in a tabular form in the questionnaire & listed in random order for each participant.
Tools/Methods very often not used at all or very rarely
pseudonyms □ □
paypal instead of online banking □ □
anonymous profile names or emails □ □
not store information online □ □
Erasery □ □
clear information or history □ □
private browsing or incognito mode □ □
DuckDuckGo □ □
clear, disallow or limit cookies □ □
Ghostery □ □
not accessing suspicious websites, careful of websites □ □
anti-tracking extension □ □
switch off location tracking □ □
Adblock □ □
anti-malware □ □
anti-spyware □ □
firewall □ □
NoScript □ □
VPN □ □
HTTPS □ □
TOR □ □
use a proxy □ □
IPHider □ □
virtual machines □ □
encryption, encrypt communication or data □ □
password manager □ □
not reuse passwords □ □
not save password on webpage □ □
not give personal information, limit sharing of personal information or give minimal personal information □ □
give fake information □ □
set privacy settings or controls □ □
not access accounts in a public place, on public networks or shared computers □ □
read terms of service or business practice □ □
limit use of social network accounts, such as Facebook or others □ □
not use Facebook at all □ □
have several email accounts or have bogus email account for unimportant use □ □
request data collection about you □ □
switch off camera on devices □ □
not subscribe to newsletters or untick boxes for newsletters □ □
opt out of data collection or not consent to data collection □ □
not engage online □ □
research before engaging online or research before signing up to stuff □ □
Kaspersky □ □
Name other privacy methods if you use them:
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B STUDY 2 DATASET
Table 13: Dataset of Privacy Methods & Count of Usage per Country.
# Tools/Methods US UK DE Total
1 not accessing suspicious websites, careful of websites 265 251 250 766
2 not give personal information or limit sharing 259 242 256 757
3 set privacy settings or controls 262 238 257 757
4 not subscribe to newsletters or untick boxes for newsletters 234 219 250 703
5 Adblock 235 197 262 694
6 clear information or history 231 235 220 686
7 anti-malware 238 217 224 679
8 firewall 211 218 250 679
9 paypal instead of online banking 201 226 250 677
10 have several email accounts 214 183 261 658
11 clear, disallow or limit cookies 225 198 219 642
12 opt out of data collection or not consent to data collection 216 202 207 625
13 HTTPS 209 172 237 618
14 not access accounts in a public place/ shared computers 224 210 171 605
15 anti-spyware 221 190 181 592
16 switch off camera on devices 206 172 209 587
17 private browsing or incognito mode 194 179 212 585
18 limit use of social network accounts 189 186 209 584
19 switch off location tracking 183 174 201 558
20 anonymous profile names or emails 175 134 228 537
21 pseudonyms 143 111 229 483
22 not reuse passwords 162 148 158 468
23 not store information online 167 144 154 465
24 not save password on webpage 147 147 149 443
25 give fake information 128 102 181 411
26 read terms of service or business practice 154 147 100 401
27 password manager 152 124 116 392
28 not use Facebook at all 131 99 160 390
29 VPN 99 86 157 342
30 encryption, encrypt communication or data 117 103 119 339
31 anti-tracking extension 93 64 126 283
32 not engage online 99 97 69 265
33 use a proxy 67 65 110 242
34 DuckDuckGo 79 39 77 195
35 request data collection about you 54 38 81 173
36 NoScript 39 21 84 144
37 IPHider 42 35 61 138
38 research before engaging online 30 35 63 128
39 Kaspersky 30 35 63 128
40 virtual machines 37 21 67 125
41 Tor 32 23 67 122
42 Ghostery 31 21 55 107
43 Erasery 27 30 37 94
Notes: This dataset is for the N = 907 sample, and sorted from most used to least used method.
This dataset was used in the Cluster and Correspondence Analyses.
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C CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS
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Figure 7: Contribution of Privacy Methods to Dimension 1.
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D STUDY 3 LISTS QUESTIONNAIRE
The instructions provided to participants to choose between two lists of PETs and the follow-up questions are as follow:
We provide two lists of privacy technologies that can be used to protect privacy online. Please take your time to read through both lists.
List A contains: Erasery, Ghostery, Virtual Machine, Tor, NoScript, IPHider, Kaspersky, DuckDuckGo, proxy, anti-tracking extension,
VPN and encryption.
List B contains: switch off location tracking, private browsing, HTTPS, anti-spyware, opt-out (of data collection), clear cookies, anti-
malware, clear history, Paypal, firewall, Adblock, privacy settings, pseudonyms and anonymous profile.
Which of the two lists contains the privacy methods that you most often use to protection your privacy online?
List A
List B
Please explain why you most often use methods from your selected list. Please explain why you very rarely (or not at all) use methods
from the other list. [Response in 50 to 100 words]
What would support you to use methods from the other list (that is, the one that you did not select)? In particular, what would help
and/or encourage you?
E STUDY 3 PERCEPTION QUESTIONNAIRE SCALE ITEMS
Table 14: Scale Items & Internal Consistency.
We provide Cronbach α for Adv. & Oth.PETs where the scale was set as pairwise comparison between PET types.
Scale Items Cronbach α
Adv.PETs Oth.PETs
Perceived Privacy Competency
I feel confident in my ability to manage my privacy online
.963I am capable of protecting my privacy online nowI am able to protect my privacy online now
I feel able to meet the challenge of protecting my privacy online
Awareness of PETs
I have heard of technologies in this list for privacy protection online
.932 .837I have encountered the technologies in this list for privacy protection online beforeI know how to find technologies in this list to protect my privacy online
I am familiar with the technologies in this list to protect my privacy online
Perceived Usefulness of PETs
Using privacy technologies in this list improves my privacy protection
.879 .842Using privacy technologies in this list increases my level of privacyUsing privacy technologies in this list enhances the effectiveness of my privacy protection
I find privacy technologies in this list to be useful in protecting my privacy
Perceived Ease of Use of PETs
My interaction with privacy technologies in this list is clear and understandable
.868 .798Interacting with privacy technologies in this list does not require a lot of mental effortI find privacy technologies in this list to be easy to use
I find it easy to get privacy technologies in this list to do what I want them to do
Social Influence
People who are important to me think that I should use privacy technologies in this list
.891 .881People who influence my behaviour think that I should use privacy technologies in this listPeople whose opinion I value prefer that I use privacy technologies in this list
Behavior Intention
I intend to use privacy technologies in this list in the future
.886 .813I will always try to use privacy technologies in this list in my daily lifeI plan to use privacy technologies in this list frequently
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F STUDY 3 CODEBOOK
Table 15: The 47 codes in the final codebook for Study 3
Q1: Reason for choosing one PET type Q2: Support or encouragement
Code Content Code Content
Effectiveness of PETs Privacy need
EFF01 effective for the privacy I need, adequate, sufficient PNE01 if I had a bigger privacy need, extreme privacy
EFF02 used it and it works - so continue to use PNE02 needed for different specific privacy protections such as tracking prevention
EFF03-other everyday, regular use PNE03 provides more privacy than the one I use
EFF03-other trust, reliable, best method
Information or training to enhance understanding
Awareness of PETs INF01 if I know what they are/what they do
AWA1 familiar with, recognise, heard of, know of INF02 Information on how to use or training or education
AWA2 not familiar with, not recognise, not heard of, don’t know of INF03 Information channel such as advertising, social media, tutorial, app
AWA3 aware of though advertisements INF04-other benefits of using, why use
AWA4-other advised, recommended INF04-other tech knowledge
Skills needed Usability related supports
SKI01 casual, non-tech user USS1 convenient
SKI02 training needed, need to understand or know more, technical user USS2 easy to use, simple, clear
SKI03-other someone to show me USS3 easy to install, setup, not many config
USS4 lightweight, not many things, easy integration
Usability & cost characteristics of PET USS5 easy access
USR1 readily or easily available, builtin, presented within service
USR2 not easily or not readily available Social influence or social support
USR3 easy to use, easy to install, not much effort needed SOC01 social influence - if someone I know use it, or someone I trust recommends it
USR4 complicated to use or complicated to setup SOC02 social support - someone teaches me, someone installs it
USR5 convenient features SOC03-other neutral recommend, review, professional reputable company, accreditation
USR6 cost - available free
USR7 cost - expensive or have to pay for Miscellaneous
USR8-other accessibility, easy access INC01 if I knew they did not pose a security threat, if I trust them
USR8-other amount of work vs benefit, having to download/install INC02 free of cost, affordable
USR8-other annoyance, discomfort, break things INC03 already use both lists
USR8-other integrated in service INC04-other tradeoff with browsing or computer performance
Privacy needed, experience
PRI01 no need for privacy
PRI02 privacy vs hamper online experience
PRI03 provide protection, keeps me privacy/safe, increase my privacy
PRI05 use PETs from both lists
PRI06-other over the top, extreme privacy
